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Both mergers and innovation are central elements of a firm’s competitive strategy. However, model-theoretical 
analysis of the merger-innovation link is sparse. The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of mergers on 
innovative activities and product market competition in the context of incremental process innovations. 
Inefficiencies due to organizational problems of mergers are accounted for. We show that optimal investment 
strategies depend on the resulting market structure and differ significantly from insider to outsider. In our linear 
model mergers turn out to increase social surplus. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are instruments for the growth, diversification and rationalization of 
companies. Innovation is a way for firms to achieve and maintain a competitive advantage. So 
both these elements are fundamental to a firm’s competitive strategy. To improve our 
understanding of firms’ investment decisions and cooperations it is therefore necessary to 
comprehend the interdependencies between these important factors.  
Moreover, the approval process of mergers is more and more influenced by the impact of 
mergers on the innovative activities in the market. Mergers are typically considered to harm 
consumers. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show in a Cournot oligopoly that for a merger to 
reduce prices and thus to increase consumer surplus considerable synergies are required. 
Diffusion of know-how and economies of scale and scope in R&D are typical elements of 
efficiency defenses of mergers (Röller, Stennek, Verboven, 2000). Gilbert and Tom (2001) 
claim that innovation concerns in merger cases rose significantly in the last decades. 
However, they argue that it is difficult to asses the immediate impact of innovation on the 
approval process in these cases. This is at least partly caused by the several opposing effects 
of mergers on innovation incentives. Katz and Shelanski (2004) argue that innovation - as one 
of the most important drivers of economic welfare - must be considered when deciding about 
the approval of a proposed merger. They distinguish between the “innovation incentives” 
criterion, i.e. how the merger changes the incentives to innovate and the “innovation impact” 
criterion, i.e. how is the effect of innovation on the market, especially comparing the situation 
before and after the merger. Katz and Shelanski argue that both the effect from market 
structure on innovation and the backwards effect from innovation on market structure are 
important in the analysis. 
The interdependencies of mergers and innovation have a widespread effect on a firm’s 
strategy. A merger changes the market structure as firm size and concentration is typically 
increased. This leads to different output levels of firms which in turn influence the firm’s 
investment decisions. Furthermore, the innovation market itself may be affected by the 
merger. Fewer competitors may increase the probability to win a patent race and lead to more 
investments. On the other hand, the reduced competitive pressure may lead to a reduction in 
innovation. Another important effect of mergers is the restructuring process. To capture 
potential synergies in the innovation sector, R&D departments have to be reorganized which 
may lead to personnel problems caused by fear of dismissals, loss of key researchers and   3
changes in the organization structure. Finally, the innovative ability of a firm may be a direct 
reason for a merger. Firms can substitute own R&D by the acquisition of other companies. 
This complexity may be a reason why model-theoretical analysis of the merger-innovation 
link is sparse. However, if the analysis is focused on certain sub aspects important 
conclusions can be drawn. Banal-Estanol et al. (2004) use a 3 stage game model with 3 firms 
to deduct incentives to merge and to innovate in a Cournot market. They analyze situations 
with and without internal conflict where firms can either invest or not invest in a cost 
reduction. Their focus is on the internal organization of a firm and the stability of mergers. In 
contrast to Banal-Estanol et al. (2004) we analyze exogenous mergers and focus on incentives 
to innovate. Moreover, we do also allow for asymmetric situations after the merger. Jost and 
van der Velden (2006) analyze mergers in a patent contest model and show that a merger can 
be beneficial to the merging firms even if synergetic effects are rather low. However, their 
model fully concentrates on the innovation market as the winner of the patent race is awarded 
a monopoly profit in the output market. In contrast, we model both competition in the 
innovation and in the output market. Other theoretical papers on mergers and innovation 
rather establish rules of thumb or guidelines for analyzing mergers in an innovation context 
(see for example Katz and Shelanski, 2004).  
Empirical work on this subject can be grouped in two categories: Organizational issues and 
strategic aspects. The organizational literature deals with the effect of mergers on R&D 
employees and the internal organization of R&D. Bommer and Jalajas (1999) show that even 
only the threat of organizational downsizing can have a negative impact on the innovative 
performance, i.e. willingness to make suggestions, risk taking and job motivation. Internal 
resistance to the merger may lead to several other problems: Communication problems among 
new fellow employees, denial of products and processes from the other company, the “not-
invented-here” syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982) and agency problems that affect the 
motivation of researchers (see Cassiman et al., 2005). A study of Ernst and Vitt (2000) shows 
that almost a third of key inventors, i.e. persons responsible for high quality and high quantity 
patents, quit the merged company. This behavior often leads to a dramatic reduction in 
innovative performance. The personnel problem is directly linked to R&D reorganization. 
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2000) analyze the impact of organizational differences on the 
success of mergers. They measure the degree of similarity by the size of companies and find 
empirical support for their hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the 
similarity in size of the companies to merge and the post merger technological performance, 
measured by total numbers of patents applied for.   4
The empirical literature on strategic aspects of mergers deals with the firms’ merger and 
innovation policy and how this policy is influenced by the firm’s and competitors’ 
characteristics. Cefis et al. (2005) study the effect of mergers on the optimal mix of 
investments in product and process innovations. They find empirical support for their 
hypothesis that firms involved in mergers invest more in product than in process innovations. 
Furthermore, they find that R&D efficiency decreases, which is attributed to post-merger 
integration problems. Gugler and Siebert (2004) analyze the efficiency effects of mergers and 
R&D joint ventures with focus on the development of market shares after a merger. They find 
positive developments of market shares both for mergers and R&D joint ventures, but 
stronger and longer lasting effects for joint ventures. However, their study is on the 
semiconductor industry, which is one of the most R&D intensive and innovative industries. 
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2000) analyze the effect of strategic fit of companies, measured by 
technological and product market relatedness, on the success of a merger and find empirical 
support for their hypothesis that more related companies show a better technological 
performance after the merger. This effect is attributed to economies of scale and scope in 
R&D. Another strategic aspect of mergers in innovation context is the substitution of own 
R&D by the acquisition of R&D active companies. Dessyllas and Hughes (2005) examine the 
acquirers of these strategic buys. They assume that firms with lower R&D input and output 
are more likely to acquire R&D active firms, which is supported by their analysis. Moreover, 
they find empirical evidence of their hypothesis that a certain level of knowledge about 
technology, measured by stock of patents, is needed to identify potential candidates for 
acquisition and to use the acquired knowledge efficiently.
1 
It is difficult to identify the main drivers of a successful merger in the R&D context from 
these strands of literature as the empirical results lead into different directions and focus on 
different topics.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of horizontal mergers on the innovative efforts 
of merging and non-merging firms. Firms compete in innovation activities as well as in 
product markets. We focus our analysis on the minimal structure that allows for the 
distinction of merging and non-merging firms, i.e. we start from a market structure with 3 
active firms. Depending on the modeling strategy of mergers it is well known that mergers 
may turn out to be not profitable if innovation is not modeled. In contrast we find that the 
inclusion of competition in innovative activities renders most mergers profitable. This is a 
                                                 
1 This knowledge level is also called absorptive capacity (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).   5
first result and confirms a result of Jost and van der Velden (2006) in a different modeling 
context.  
In a first step to explore the impact of a merger on innovative activities we ignore any 
organizational problems of a merger. Using linear demand and cost structures we find that a 
merger induces higher innovative efforts of the merging firms. In order to test the robustness 
of this finding – and of the other results – we screen the most popular modeling strategies for 
mergers. They will be spelled out further below. It turns out that this finding is robust in this 
respect. However, the impact of a merger on the non-merging firm’s incentive to innovate 
depends on the modeling strategy. The same holds true for the impact of a merger on 
consumer surplus as well as on social surplus although it is positive in most cases. 
In a second step we introduce the organizational problems of a merger by assuming an 
increased level of R&D costs for the merging firms. This provides a much richer picture 
where it is not guaranteed that the merging firms’ incentive to innovate increases. Whether a 
merger induces higher incentives to innovate for any of the firms depends on how mergers are 
modeled as well as on the level of inefficiencies due to the organizational problems. 
Interestingly, in most cases a merger still increases social surplus.  
Innovation is generally considered to be the introduction of new methods, improved versions 
of former products and processes or completely new inventions. In our paper we focus on 
process innovations, i.e. a reengineered or newly developed production process aiming at 
producing goods more efficiently. Additionally, we assume that all knowledge acquired by 
innovation efforts stays within the company, i.e. that there are no “knowledge spillovers”. 
We analyze mergers for three popular modeling approaches. We also consider R&D joint 
ventures as they are often considered to have the positive synergy effects of a merger without 
reducing competition in the output market.  
Firms play a noncooperative 2 stage game under complete information. In the first stage they 
decide about their investments in process innovations and by doing so set their marginal costs. 
In the second stage firms choose quantities. The game is solved by backwards induction. This 
2 stage model is similar to a model of R&D joint ventures by Rosenkranz (2003). However, 
she focuses on the different external effects of process and product innovation while our focus 
is on the different effects in several forms of mergers. Furthermore, in her analysis all firms 
remain competitors in the output market while we allow for mergers. 
The benchmark case with 3 identical firms is compared to a situation where 2 firms merge or 
cooperate on R&D. We do not consider mergers to monopoly or R&D joint ventures of all 
firms as these cooperations would lead to no competition in the product or innovation market.    6
In the cases of merger, we distinguish three possibilities for the resulting market structure. 
The first case is the simple closure of one firm. This way of modeling the merger refers to 
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) and is therefore denoted as case SSR. The second type 
refers to Daughety (1990) and models the merged company as a Stackelberg-Leader in the 
resulting market. This is denoted as case D. Creane and Davidson (2005) propose another way 
of modeling the merger. The two companies involved in the merger remain separate divisions 
but set their quantities sequentially. Thus, one division is a Stackelberg-Leader in the intra-
firm game. The outsider is aware of the internal structure but treats each of the merged firm’s 
divisions as a Cournot competitor. This case is referred to as case CD.
2 Finally, the results of 
an R&D joint venture are analyzed (case JV). We derive optimal investment strategies and 
quantities and the resulting profits. In order to analyze the impact of our model parameters we 
calculate some comparative statics. Our results show that optimal investment strategies 
depend on the resulting market structure and differ significantly from insider to outsider. In 
some settings mergers are profitable while in other settings outsiders benefit from mergers. 
The effect on consumer welfare, measured by total output, depends on the resulting market 
structure. The impact of innovation costs on profits is also ambiguous. We show that some 
firms prefer low innovation costs while others benefit from increasing innovation costs. This 
effect is due to the strategic aspect of investment in innovation.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our model and analyze the impact 
of mergers on innovation and product markets, ignoring inefficiencies due to organizational 
problems. We also report some results on comparative statics. Section 3 introduces efficiency 
losses of the combined R&D department due to internal organization problems. Section 4 





There are 3 (a priori identical) firms with homogenous products facing a linear inverse 
demand function:  1 = − p X  with  =∑ i X x . This demand can be derived using a 
representative consumer with utility function  ( )
2 1
2 , Uxy x x y = −+ , with y being a 
numeraire good. In addition to the typical possibility to choose output strategically, firms can 
                                                 
2 Huck, Konrad and Müller (2003) provide similar arguments for modeling horizontal mergers that way and 
derive comparable results. However, their argumentation is a bit different as they use an endogenous timing 
approach. In our setup, there is no preference for either of these two motivations for the internal structure change 
due to the merger.   7
influence their marginal costs via process innovations. The costs for these innovations are 
() ()
2 00 6
5 0, ii i Kc k c c c c k =⋅ − ≤ ≤ > .
3 Without innovation, firms have constant marginal 
costs 
0 1 c <
4. Firms are assumed to maximize profits  () ()
2 0
ii i i p cxk cc π =−⋅ − ⋅− , i.e. 
product profitability minus total innovation costs. For simplicity, we assume that firms have 
no fixed costs.
5  
Investment in innovation is done in stage 1, setting of quantities in stage 2. We assume no 
discounting between these stages.
6 This setup is clearly quite special, in particular with 
respect to the inverse demand functions and the cost structure of the firms. This simplification 
is done for the ease of calculation and notation. Even in this particular setup differences 
between the considered market structures become obvious and the effects of a merger or a 
cooperation differ significantly from insider to outsider. 
 
2.1 Benchmark Case 
The benchmark case is a simple Cournot game with the additional possibility to invest in 
process innovations to reduce marginal cost prior to the quantity setting game. Hence, the 
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In the first stage, firms can choose their investment in process innovations. Equation (1) is 






























Inserting the optimal c in the profit function yields the profit in the optimum: 
                                                 
3 The parameter k has to be that high to assure that innovations are nondrastic in all cases, i.e. to guarantee 
interior solutions. We derive this barrier in the appendix. In the following, we refer to k as innovation costs while 
K(c) is called total innovation costs. 
4 The lower bound for these initial marginal costs is dependent on the innovation cost parameter k and is derived 
in the appendix. 
5 This assumption is not necessary in our model. However, some results concerning changes in total profits may 
change quantitatively, depending on how the merger or a R&D joint venture affects fixed costs.  
6 However, the innovation cost parameter k can be reinterpreted to allow for time preferences.  
7 Second order conditions are satisfied here and in all other cases (see appendix).    8
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The benchmark case is now compared with all merger cases and with a joint venture. Our 
main focus is the investment in innovations, the total output and the profits of insider and 
outsider. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that firm 1 and 2 cooperate. In cases CD and JV we 
assume that they have a combined R&D department leading to identical marginal costs for 
firm 1 and 2. In this section, we assume that the reduction from two to one R&D department 
works without problems. Therefore the merged firm has the same cost function for R&D as 
before. We relax this assumption in section 3. 
 
2.2 Case SSR 
This way of modeling a merger refers to Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). Firm 1 and 2 
merge and one of these companies is closed down. In effect, this merger changes the market 












leading to the profit depending on marginal costs: 
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The optimal investment in cost reducing innovations is higher than in the benchmark case 
leading to lower marginal costs for the SSR firms: 
**
,, iS S R iB cc < . Total innovation costs are 
better covered with sales due to the increased output level of each individual firm. This result 
is in accordance with a more general analysis of Vives (2004) that proves in a symmetric 
market with restricted entry increasing the number of firms tends to reduce R&D effort.  
Inserting the optimal c in the profit function yields:  
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Comparing this profit with the combined profit of firm 1 and 2 in the benchmark case leads to 
an interesting result. For  1.99772 k <  the profit in the duopoly is higher.
8 Thus, the additional 
innovation stage in our model makes a merger profitable for the merging firms if innovation 
costs are lower than a certain bound. In the original Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) 
model, a merger of 2 firms without synergies is never profitable. This result is striking as we 
do not explicitly assume synergies in our model. However, the reduction from two to one 
R&D department in the merged company can be interpreted as a synergy of this merger. 
Investment is only made once in the merged company. In the benchmark case, each firm 
invests in its own cost reduction. Furthermore, each company has a higher output compared to 
the benchmark case, leading to higher incentives to innovate and an increased profit. The 
outsider benefits from the merger, as in the Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) model. 
Consumer welfare can simply be compared via total quantity, which is larger in the 
benchmark case. The optimal quantity is influenced by two opposing forces. The reduction 
from three to two firms increases output per firm but the overall output is decreased. On the 
other hand, the firms invest more in innovation leading to lower marginal costs. The reason 
for this increase in investment is the increased output level of each firm. The firms can spread 
their total innovation costs over more output. The effect of reduced competition in the output 
market is stronger and thus the total quantity is lower in case SSR. 




41 31 61 12
32 3 2 0
16 3 9 2 6 59 144
BS S R
ck ck ck k
xx
kk k k
⋅− ⋅ ⋅− ⋅ ⋅− ⋅ ⋅ − +
⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ = >
−− − +
. 
Thus, a merger in the SSR case is always beneficial to the outsider, can be beneficial to the 
insider and is never beneficial to consumers. The effect on social surplus depends on the 
innovation cost parameter. For low innovation costs ( 1.56209 k < ) the effect on social surplus 
is positive. In this parameter range the merger is beneficial for insider and outsider and the 
reduction in output is low. If innovation cost are above that bound, the negative effect from 
consumer surplus dominates and the merger is welfare decreasing. 
 
2.3 Case D 
In case D two firms merge and become Stackelberg-Leader in the resulting market. Daughety 
(1990) justifies this way of modeling a merger. An intuitive idea is that the merged company 
is somehow bigger than the original company and therefore has a special status. Investment in 
innovation is still simultaneous.
9 The resulting market structure is thus a Stackelberg market 
                                                 
8 The proof of this and the following statements can be found in the appendix. 
9 If we assume that the merged company is only leader in the innovation market but both firms remain equal 
competitors in the output market, the leader invests more in R&D than the follower while both firms invest more   10





















of the outsider. 
Resulting profits are 
























These profits are maximized by choosing optimal investments. Differentiating with respect to 
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The optimal investment of the Stackelberg-Leader is higher than the one of the follower 
(
**
M O cc < ). The leader invests more in cost reducing innovations than the firms in the 
benchmark case (
**
M B cc < ) while the follower invests less (
**
OB cc > ). 
The insider’s profit  
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is larger than two times the profit in the benchmark case, while the outsider’s profit 
                                                                                                                                                          
compared to the benchmark case. The merger is still profitable for the merged company if k<2.0231 and always 
profitable for the outsider. The proof is available from the author upon request.    11
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is smaller than the profit of one firm in the benchmark case.  
Without the possibility to innovate, all firms are indifferent to the merger, as in this case the 
combined profit of firm 1 and 2 would equal the merged firm’s profit. The same is true for the 
outsider.
10 Again the reduction of total innovation costs due to merging and having only one 
R&D lab makes the merger profitable. The effect has also a negative influence on the 
outsider: As the insider can spread his R&D costs over more output, he invests more in 
innovation leading to lower marginal costs. The outsider cannot profitably invest that much in 
innovation. Thus he has higher marginal costs, lower output and a lower profit compared to 
the benchmark case. 
Total output in case D is 














which is higher than in the benchmark case: 
 









16 3 3 17 16
21 3 4
0







⋅− ⋅ ⋅− ⋅ ⋅ − +






In this setting, the reduction from three to two firms has no effect on total output if all firms 
don’t innovate. Thus, only the effect from innovation remains. This effect has to be analyzed 
separately for insider and outsider. The insider’s optimal investment is higher than in the 
benchmark case, as analyzed above. This leads to an increase of his output. The outsider is 
negatively influenced by this reduction of the insider’s marginal costs and invests less than in 
the benchmark case. Therefore, the outsider’s output is reduced. But as the insider accounts 
for a larger proportion of output, the overall output is increased.
11 
Comparing the results with the benchmark case, we see that the merging firms and consumers 
benefit from the merger while it is never beneficial to the outsider. The surplus of insider and 
consumers is larger than the profit shortfall of the outsider leading to an increase of social 
surplus. 
 
                                                 
10 This can be easily verified looking at the profits of insider and outsider for identical marginal costs and no 
investment in innovation. 
11 This result is in line with Daughety (1990) who states that mergers and increases in concentration can be 
socially beneficial if an asymmetric situation occurs.    12
2.4 Case CD 
In the CD case, it is assumed that the merged company has two independent divisions. This 
way of modeling a merger refers to Creane and Davidson (2005). The parent company 
rewards the manager of each division according to his division’s profit. Therefore, both 
managers set their quantities in order to maximize their division’s profit. The multidivisional 
firm encourages competition across its divisions.
12 The two companies involved in the merger 
do not set their quantities simultaneously, but sequentially. Thus, one division is the 
Stackelberg-Leader in the intra-firm game. As this division’s manager is only concerned 
about his own profit he becomes more aggressive in the market and increases his division’s 
market share. This strategic change of the company’s organization leads to an increased 
market share of the merged company. Investment in innovation is done in order to maximize 
the joint profit of both divisions. The new technology can be used by both divisions. We call 
the leader in the merged company division 1, the follower division 2 and the other firm 
outsider.  
The profit of division 2 is given by: 
(3)  ( ) 22 1 2 2 1 D DD D o m D x xx xc x π =⋅ −−−− ⋅  
Maximizing (3) with respect to  2 D x  yields the optimal output of division 2 as a function of the 












The leader’s profit is thus: 
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The outsider’s profit is given by 
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12 An overview of empirical evidence for this competition in multidivisional firms is given in Creane and 
Davidson (2005) and in Huck, Konrad and Müller (2003).   13
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Note that for identical marginal costs the outsider’s and the follower’s quantities are the same. 























The entire company has to pay the total innovation costs  ( ) m Kc  and thus has combined 
profits: 
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The outsider’s profits are: 
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It is easy to see that for identical marginal costs, the overall output rises compared to the 
benchmark case. This result is a replication of the Creane and Davidson (2005) results that 
any merger in this setting lowers prices. Furthermore, the profit of the outsider decreases. But 
without the innovation stage, this merger would also reduce profits of firm 1 and 2 as 
() ()
22 3 2
25 16 11 cc ⋅− < ⋅− . 




















cc k c c
c





=− ⋅ + − − ⋅ − =
∂
∂
=− ⋅ − + − ⋅ − =
∂
 





24 30 110 125
24 140 125
m
kk c k c
c
kk








24 20 120 125
24 140 125
o
kk c k c
c
kk




As in case D the optimal investment of the insider is higher than the outsider’s optimal 
investment (
**
mo cc < ). The insider’s optimal investment is higher than the optimal investment 
in the benchmark case (
**
mB cc < ) while the outsider’s investment is lower (
**
oB cc > ). 
The insider’s profit  















is larger than two times the benchmark case profit as long as  9.20472 k < . This result is 
different to the original Creane and Davidson (2005) result. In their setup without innovation 
a bilateral merger is only profitable if there are at least four firms active in the market. In our 
setting it is profitable for three active firms in the market, if the innovation costs are not too 
large. 
The outsider’s profit  















is smaller than in the benchmark case. 
Interpretation is quite similar to case D. The insider invests more in R&D and puts pressure 
on the outsider. This is possible as he can spread his total innovation costs over a larger 
output. Having less output, the outsider is not able to invest that much in R&D and therefore 
has higher marginal costs. Thus, he looses profit compared to the symmetric benchmark case. 
Total output is 
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which is again larger than in the benchmark case: 
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In the CD case, the effects from changes in the market structure and innovation of the insider 
on total output go in the same direction. Without innovation the increase in output would be   15
from  ( )
0 3
4 1 c ⋅−  to  ( )
0 4
5 1 c ⋅− . This is due to aggressive behavior of division 1, the 
Stackelberg-Leader in the intra firm game. Furthermore, the merged company invests more in 
innovation compared to the benchmark case and thus marginal costs are reduced more. This 
leads to an increase in output. The outsider invests less, causing a reduced output but the 
effect from the changes in market structure and from the merged company overbalance the 
outsider’s reduction und thus, total output increases.  
In this setup, consumers always benefit from the merger, for the merging firms it depends on 
the innovation cost parameter k while the outsider is always harmed by the merger. The effect 
on social surplus is always positive. 
 
2.5 Case R&D Joint Venture 
R&D joint ventures are often considered to be consumer friendly as wasteful duplication of 
R&D efforts is avoided while the output market is still competitive. D’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) theoretically analyze the efficiency effects of R&D joint ventures and 
Gugler and Siebert (2004) provide empirical evidence for these efficiencies in the 
semiconductor industry. The main difference between R&D joint ventures and mergers is that 
firms remain competitors in the output market.  
In our model firm 1 and 2 only cooperate only in the first stage, i.e. in the innovation market. 
In the second stage, the firms compete on quantities as in the benchmark case. Firm 1 and 2 
have an R&D joint venture leading to identical marginal costs  12JV ccc = = . Therefore, the 
resulting quantities for firm 1 and 2 are also identical. Solving the optimization problem of the 























The resulting profits, assuming that each firm in the R&D joint venture pays half of the R&D 
costs, are 
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The combined quantity of firm 1 and 2 is identical to the quantity of the Stackelberg-Leader 
and the quantity of firm 3 is identical to the one of the follower in case D. This leads to   16
identical optimization problems in the first stage as the combined profit of firm 1 and 2 equals 
the Stackelberg-Leader’s profit and the outsider’s profit in the joint venture case is also the 
same as the follower’s profit in case D. Thus, investment in innovation, resulting profit, 
optimal quantities and the other results are identical to case D. The occurrence of identical 
results in these two cases is of course by chance and is heavily dependent on the assumption 
of linear demand and constant marginal costs. These assumptions cause the Stackelberg-
Leader in case D to produce exactly two times the quantity of one firm in the benchmark or 
the R&D joint venture case. However, in a more general setup we expect the results to be 
comparable as well. This result is very interesting in the context of merger or R&D joint 
ventures approvals. If a certain market structure establishes after the merger, the effects on 
consumer welfare of a merger is comparable to that of an R&D joint venture, in our model it 
is even completely identical. The empirical results of Gugler and Siebert (2004) on market 
shares at least partly support this view. Both mergers and R&D joint ventures cause market 




2.6 Comparative Statics 
In this section we analyze the influence of the model’s parameters. By calculating some 
comparative statics with respect to the initial level of marginal costs and the innovation cost 
parameter  k we derive some interesting results concerning the optimal innovation 
environment for companies and consumers. Please keep in mind that  6
5 k >  is assumed.  
The more expensive it is to reduce marginal costs (i.e. the higher k is) the lower is the total 








in all market structures. This result is not surprising, as the innovation cost parameter 
influences investments and thus marginal costs. If the reduction of marginal costs gets more 
expensive, firm’s total investment in innovation is decreasing leading to higher marginal 
costs.
14 Thus, the overall output decreases. To improve consumer welfare it is therefore 
always useful to foster an innovation friendly environment. 
An interesting result is the change in profits for increasing innovation costs. While the 
insiders in cases D, CD and JV suffer from increasing innovation costs, the profits of the 
                                                 
13 The superior performance of R&D joint ventures may be caused by less integration problems of the R&D 
department. This is addressed in section 3. 
14 There are exceptions for the outsider’s investment in cases D and CD for a certain parameter range (proofs are 
available from the author upon request). However, the insider’s effect is dominant.    17
outsiders in these cases as well as the profits of firms in the symmetric cases (benchmark and 
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The reason for this unexpected result is the effect of k on the innovation market. Of course a 
decrease of the factor k reduces total innovation costs for a fixed c. On the other hand it 
increases innovation competition. As k increases total investment in innovations is reduced. 
This leads to higher marginal costs and lower product profitability. But as all firms have 
higher marginal costs, this loss is not that high. The outsiders and the firms in the symmetric 
cases overcompensate the loss in product profitability by the reduced investment in 
innovations. The insiders in cases C, CD and JV have a higher output and therefore the loss in 
product profitability is higher and cannot be covered by the lower investment in innovations. 
This result shows that not all firms appreciate reductions in innovation costs. If a government 
reduces innovation costs, for example by facilitating patent approval processes or by granting 
innovation support programs, only some firms benefit.  
Looking at the profit function of all firms, we see the factor ( )
2 0 1 c −+  in all cases. Thus, 
firms’ profits fall with increasing initial marginal costs 








In other words, the more efficient firm’s initial production is, the higher is the resulting profit. 
 
3. Decrease of R&D efficiency due to post merger integration problems 
 
So far we assumed that the merged firm has the same costs for R&D as the former 
independent companies. We relax this assumption to allow for organizational problems. As 
our focus is the effects on innovation, we only consider inefficiencies of the merging R&D 
departments. Cefis et al. (2005) show that firms involved in acquisitions have a lower 
efficiency in R&D than independently competing firms. They attribute this efficiency loss to 
post merger integration problems.  
If post merger integration problems occur we assume the R&D cost function to be   18
  () ( )
2 o
ii Kc k c c α =⋅ ⋅ − , 
where  ( ] 1; 2 α ∈  is an efficiency parameter. Thus, the merged company now faces increased 
innovation costs  ˆ kk k α =⋅> compared to the outsider. In this section we analyze the effect 
of these efficiency losses for each case.
15 As becomes apparent from the appendix, the 
resulting complexity of terms does not lend itself to proceed analytically for all parameter 
values simultaneously. However, the impact of the increased cost of R&D for merging firms 
can be visualized by corresponding plots and the study of some representative values for the 
innovation cost parameter k. 
 
3.1 Case SSR 
The situation is no longer symmetric and so we have to distinguish between insider and 
outsider. Innovation is now more costly for the merged firm leading to higher marginal cost 
and lower profits for the insider. The outsider benefits from the increased costs of its rival and 
invests more in innovation. Thus, the efficiency losses lead to lower profits for the insider and 
increased profits of the outsider. Figure 1 shows the change of insider’s and outsider’s profits 
to the benchmark case for innovation costs between  6
5  and 5 and efficiency parameters α  
between 1 and 2. We see that for very small α  and k the merger is still profitable for the 
insider. If α  or k increases, the merger gets unprofitable. For the outsider, the merger is 
always profitable. The profitability increases in α  as the outsider’s superior position in R&D 
increases with α . The occurrence of integration problems worsens the situation for 
consumers. The merger leads to a decrease in total output. With increasing integration 
problems, total innovation costs rise leading to higher marginal costs and a lower output of 
each firm. The same is true for social surplus. Only for very small innovation costs and little 
integration problems the merger can enhance social surplus.  
                                                 
15 Calculations are basically the same as before and are given in the appendix. The innovation decision in the 
joint venture case is still identical to case D.   19
 
Figure 1: Profit comparison case SSR, insider and outsider 
 
3.2 Case D 
If integration problems occur, the position of the Stackelberg leader is not as dominant as 
before. The merged company now has increased costs of innovation compared to the outsider 
while it can still spread these costs over a larger output. The dominating effect is dependent 
on α . For  4
3 α <  the size effect dominates and the insider still invests more in innovation 
compared to the benchmark case. The outsider invests more if the effect from increased costs 
dominates, i.e. if  4
3 α > . For  4
3 α =  both the insider and outsider have the same marginal 
costs as in the benchmark case. As the Stackelberg-Leader produces exactly twice the 
quantity of one firm and the follower the same as one firm in a Cournot Triopoly, total output 
is then also identical to the benchmark case. Figure 2 shows a comparison of total quantity 

























Figure 2: Changes in total quantity, case D  
 
We see that consumers benefit from the merger if  4
3 α < , i.e. if the larger firm has lower 













































insider  outsider  20
figure 3). If α  is high he does not benefit much from its reduction of R&D departments and if 
k is small, the outsider reduces marginal costs very much causing a loss of market share for 
the insider. The outsider benefits from the merger if  4
3 α > . Social surplus is always 
increasing. 
 
Figure 3: Profit comparison case D, insider and outsider 
 
3.3 Case CD 
In the CD case, the insider invests more compared to the benchmark case up to a certain limit 
of α  which depends on k. The outsider invests less, except for really low values of k and high 
values of α . The merger is profitable for the insider if integration problems are not too high 
and is never beneficial for the outsider (see figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Profit comparison case CD, insider and outsider 
 
Total quantity and social surplus are always increased. This is due to the changed organization 
in the merged company. The aggressive behavior of the intrafirm Stackelberg-Leader causes 
total quantity to rise significantly and thus leading to higher consumer surplus. If integration 
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the merger. Even in this situation the rise in consumer surplus caused by the changed market 
structure overcompensates this loss leading to an increase in social surplus. 
 
3.4 Summary 
To illustrate results, we analyze the changes compared to the benchmark case for some 
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Table 1 Comparisons for illustrative innovation cost parameters 
 
If we allow for efficiency losses of the R&D department we get ambiguous results caused by 
the effect of innovation costs. In the SSR case the insider is even worse off. Without 
integration problems he was at least in an identical situation as the outsider, now he suffers 
from less efficient innovation. The merged firm in cases D and CD can spread its total 
innovation costs over a larger output but innovation costs increase due to the losses in R&D 
efficiency. The positive effects on market shares for the insider are reduced because of the 
integration problems. Still insiders tend to benefit from mergers in case D and CD but only up 
to a certain bound  () k α . The outsider is always harmed by the merger in case CD, in case D 
only up to  4
3 α = . In all cases the outsider benefits from an increase in α  as this improves his 
position in the innovation market. The introduction of integration problems also leads to 
changes in welfare analysis. Less efficient R&D harms consumers as marginal costs after 
innovation are higher and thus total quantity is lower. In case D a merger without integration   22
problems is always beneficial for consumers while sufficiently large integration problems lead 
to a decrease in consumer surplus.  
This result may partly explain the empirical findings of Gugler and Siebert (2004). If we 
expect the integration problems of R&D joint ventures to be lower than those of mergers, for 
example because the integration can fully concentrate on R&D issues, the α  of R&D joint 
ventures would be lower compared to mergers. Thus, innovation is more efficiently 
performed in the joint venture leading to a more significant increase in market shares for firms 




This paper shows - in a simplified framework - the effects of a merger on the incentives to 
innovate in different market structures. In our 3 firm model we allow firms to invest in 
innovation in the first stage and to set optimal quantities in the second. Thus, firms first 
compete on the innovation market and strategically set their investment in innovation that 
determines their marginal costs of production. Then they compete in quantities. We compare 
the basic situation with three identical firms to merger and R&D joint venture situations. In all 
resulting market structures, a merger can be beneficial to the merging company, depending on 
the innovation cost parameter k. In the SSR and CD case it is only beneficial if innovation 
costs are sufficiently low while in case D (and for an R&D joint venture) it is beneficial 
independent of the innovation costs. Except for the SSR case, where insider and outsider are 
symmetric, the outsider is harmed by the merger. This result is in accordance with empirical 
results from Banerjee and Eckard (1998) analyzing the first great merger wave. In all 
asymmetric cases the merger is disadvantageous for the outsider. A characteristic result of all 
asymmetric situations is that the insider invests more in innovation compared to the 
benchmark case while the outsider invests less. The reason for this result is that the insider 
can spread his total innovation costs over more output and therefore has higher incentives to 
reduce his marginal costs. Consumers benefit from the merger (except for the SSR case). The 
asymmetrical situation leads to higher investments in innovation, lower marginal cost and 
therefore to a better supply of the good.  
If we allow for decreasing R&D efficiency due to the merger results get ambiguous. The 
effect from increased innovation costs pushes in the opposite direction as the effect caused by 
increased output. Thus, results depend heavily on the changes in R&D efficiency.    23
Our model has several limitations. Firstly, we do not consider uncertainty about the results of 
R&D effort. While this is certainly a key aspect of innovation, we omit the problem of 
unknown outcomes of R&D investments and the associated discussion about the degree of 
risk aversion to have a clear focus on the innovation incentives resulting from changes in 
market structure. Secondly, our model is static. We do not consider entry of new competitors 
in the market that occurs despite of large fixed costs in high technology and R&D intensive 
markets or follow-up investments in innovation. Hence, an important extension to our model 
would be a dynamic way of modeling innovation and allowing for entry. Furthermore, we do 
not consider the possibility to license the improved technology to competitors. As the 
approval processes of mergers often discuss remedies like mandatory licensing to outsiders, 
including the possibility to license innovation would be an extension that makes our model 
more realistic. However, this would completely change the competition for innovation in our 
model as these process innovations are then most efficiently performed by only one company 
and effectively a 3 firm R&D joint venture without innovation competition is created. A third 
simplification of our model is our assumption about the cost structure of innovation and the 
linear demand for the homogeneous good. We think that our findings do not change 
qualitatively with more general demand structures and R&D cost functions, although some 
specific results, like the identical outcomes for cases D and R&D joint ventures would be 
altered of course. However, these assumptions simplify notation and analysis, especially the 
calculations of sub-game perfect equilibria. The preponderance of results concerning the 
surplus enhancing effect of mergers in an innovation context needs an analysis of more 
general demand and cost structures. 
Further research in this field should concentrate on the effect of relatedness of firms on 
changes in R&D efficiency. The analysis of Cassiman et al. (2005) shows that technology and 
market relatedness of firms has a significant impact on post-merger R&D efficiency. In a 
model with heterogeneous firms the merger decision could then be endogenised to explain 
horizontal mergers.  
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Appendix 
 
Lower bound for innovation cost parameter k: 
If innovation costs are too low, the insider can reduce its marginal costs that much that the 
outsider is forced to leave the market. The power of the insider is dependent on its market 
share and is greatest in case CD. 
We solve for the innovation costs where the optimal marginal costs of the outsider is identical 
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5 k > , the outsider cannot be pushed out of the innovation market. 
 
Second order conditions for the innovation stage: 























































































































































































































In all cases, the second order conditions are satisfied as  6
5 k >  is assumed. 
 
Lower bound for initial costs: 
To assure nonnegative marginal costs, it is necessary that the initial costs 
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Benchmark vs. SSR 
Comparing the combined profit of two firms in the benchmark case with the insider’s profits 
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The denominator is positive for all admissible values of k . The sign of the numerator depends 
on the term 
23 36 311 722 288 kk k −+ − +  which is negative for  [6
5,1.9977) k ∈  and positive 
                                                 
16 For k=6/5 we have the highest lower barrier c
0>0.25.   30
for  () 1.9977; k ∈∞ . Thus the merger is profitable for the merging firms if k is below that 
bound. 
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Benchmark vs. D (respectively JV) 
The combined profit of two firms in the benchmark case is always smaller than the insider’s 
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Benchmark vs. CD 
Comparing the combined profit of two firms in the benchmark case with the insider’s profits 
in case CD yields: 
() ()
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The sign of this expression depends on the sign of the numerator which is negative for 
9.20472 k <  and positive for  9.20472 k > . Thus, a merger in case CD is profitable if k is 
below that bound. 
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Benchmark vs. SSR 
The optimal marginal costs in case SSR are lower than in the benchmark case: 
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Benchmark vs. D (respectively JV) 
The Stackelberg-Leader invests more in cost reducing innovations than the firms in the 
benchmark case which invest more than the followers (
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Benchmark vs. CD 
The insider’s investment in cost reducing innovations is higher than the one of a firm in the 
benchmark case which is again higher than the investment of the outsider (
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Social surplus: 
Social surplus W is given by the sum of the firm’s profit plus consumer surplus, which is half 
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Social surplus is thus larger in the benchmark case if 
2 18 99 56 0 kk − +>  which is true for 
1.56209 k > . 
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Comparative statics: 
Total quantity 
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Differentiating firms’ profits in the symmetric cases and outsiders’ profits with respect to 
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Thus, these firms benefit from increasing innovation costs. 
On the other hand, the derivative of insider’s profit in case D (JV) and CD is negative and 
therefore they suffer losses from higher innovation costs:   34
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Optimal investment and quantities with integration problems 
SSR 












leading to the profit function depending on investments in innovation: 
  () () () ()
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A SSR A A A A A
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cK c x c k c c πα
−+ ⎛⎞ =− = − ⋅ ⋅ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 
  () () () ()
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BS S R B B B B B
cc
cK c x c k c c π
−+ ⎛⎞ =− = − ⋅ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, 
where A indicates the merged company and B the outsider. 
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This leads to the optimal profit:   35
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One easily verifies  AB cc =  and  AB π π =  for  1 a = . 
Inserting the optimal marginal costs in equation for optimal quantities and adding up these 
quantities yields the total quantity: 
() ( ) *
, 2
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of the outsider. 
Resulting profits are: 
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Thus, optimal profits are: 
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Total output in case D is: 
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Social Surplus is: 
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Using the profit functions derived in section 2.4 with changed innovation cost functions for 
the insider 
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This yields the optimal profits: 
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Total output in case CD is: 
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Social Surplus is: 
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